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In this paper we study Bertrand competition (i.e. price competition with
rms supplying all demand)1 under free entry, when rm size vis-a-vis market
size is exogenously given. The literature on Bertrand competition generally
does not allow for free entry, and even when it does, equilibrium properties
when rm size can be large relative to market size remain unexplored (more
detailed discussion follows). The present paper makes a beginning in this
direction. Further, we examine equilibrium prices both when rms behave
non-cooperatively, as well as when there is limited collusion among them.
We consider a model of Bertrand competition with free entry, where,
following Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2003), free entry is formalized as the
presence of inactive rms in equilibrium. To begin with we examine the case
where the rms behave non-cooperatively, i.e. solve for Nash equilibria. We
demonstrate that whether a free entry Bertrand Nash equilibrium (henceforth
FEBE) exists or not, depends on the size of the market. A FEBE exists if
1The assumption that rms supply all demand dates back to Chamberlin (1933)
and is appropriate when the costs of turning away customers are very high (see,
for example, Vives (1999)). Such costs are routinely assumed in the operations
research literature (see, Taha (1982)). Such costs may arise because of either
reputational reasons, or governmental regulations. Vives (1999) argues that such
regulations are operative in U.S. industries like electricity and telephone. Spulber
(1989) argues that the common carrier regulation can lead to a scenario where
rms supply all demand. Similarly, under certain sealed bid auctions, winning
rms have to supply all demand that comes to them.
1and only if the market size is suciently large. Further, the set of FEBE
prices constitutes an interval.
We next allow for limited collusion among the rms, formalized through
the notion of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium developed in Bernheim et al.
(1987). We nd that a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium exists whenever a
FEBE exists. In that case there is a `unique' coalition-proof Nash price that
corresponds to the minimum FEBE price. Further, this equilibrium involves
average cost pricing by active rms, leading to zero prots. We also nd that
for a suciently large increase in market size, the equilibrium price in fact
decreases.
We then relate our paper to the literature. The early literature focuses
on Bertrand competition without free entry, e.g. Vives (1999), Dastidar
(1995), Baye and Kovenock (2006), Hoernig (2002, 2007), and Roy Chowd-
hury and Sengupta (2004). While Vives (1999) and Dastidar (1995) examine
the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria, Hoernig (2002) examines Nash
equilibria in mixed strategies, while Baye and Kovenock (2006) and Hoernig
(2007) demonstrate that in the presence of xed costs Nash equilibria may
fail to exist. Roy Chowdhury and Sengupta (2004) solves for the coalition-
proof Nash equilibrium under Bertrand competition, but does not allow for
free entry.
While Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2004) does allow for free entry,
they focus on the limiting case when rm size is vanishingly small. Further,
they do not examine the coalition-proof equilibrium. The present paper thus
extends the literature by allowing for (a) free entry, (b) relatively large rm
size, and (c) both non-cooperative behaviour, as well as limited collusion
2among the rms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic
model. Non-cooperative Nash equilibria are analyzed in Section 3, while
coalition-proof equilibrium is analyzed in Section 4.
2 The Model
The market demand is rf(p), where r is a parameter for market size. There
are n rms, where n is large, all producing a single homogeneous good, and
having the same cost function, c(q), and the average cost function, AC(q).
The case of interest is when r is suciently large so that there exists p such
that p > AC(rf(p)).
The demand and the cost functions satisfy the following two assumptions.
Assumption 1. f : [0;1) ! [0;1) is continuous and strictly decreasing
on [0; ^ p) where ^ p (> 0) is a cuto price such that, f(p) > 0 if and only if
p < ^ p.
Assumption 2. (a) c : [0;1) ! [0;1) is continuous, except possibly at
the origin. Moreover, c(0) = 0 and c(q) > 0; 8q > 0.
(b) The average cost function AC : (0;1) ! (0;1), where b = limq!0 AC(q)
is well dened (with innity as a possible limit). There exists q > 0 such
that AC(q) is decreasing (respectively increasing) for q < q (respectively
q > q). Further, ^ p > c = AC(q).
We examine a game of free entry Bertrand competition where the rms si-
3multaneously announce their prices, the Chamberlin (1933) assumption holds
(so that rms supply all demand) and there is free entry.
Let Di(p1;;pi;;pn) denote the demand facing rm i when the an-





0; if pi > pj; for some j;
rf(pi)
m ; if pi  pj; 8j; and #(l : pl = pi) = m:
(1)
The prot of the i-th rm
i(p1;;pn) = (pi   AC(Di(p1;;pn)))Di(p1;;pn): (2)
We next consider a situation where m ( n) rms all charge the price p,









Assumption 3. (p;m) is strictly quasi-concave for all m.
Observe that if (p0;m)  0 for some p0 < ^ p, then for all p00 such
that p0 < p00 < ^ p, from strict quasi-concavity it follows that (p00;m) >
minf(p0;m);(^ p;m)g = minf(p0;m);0g  0.
Following Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2003), free entry is formalized
as there being inactive rms in equilibrium. Thus we focus on equilibria
where m (< n) (active) rms set the lowest price, and n m (inactive) rms
charge higher prices and have no demand.
4Given a price vector p, and a coalition T  N, we let pT denote the price
vector corresponding to the coalition T.
Given p0
T and pS, T  S, (p0
T;pS=T) denotes the s-vector where the
prices correspond to p0
T for rms in T, and to pS for rms in S=T.
For a coalition T  N; the price vector p0
T constitutes a protable devia-
tion from pN if
i(p
0
T;pN=T) > i(pN); 8i 2 T:
Denition. A Bertrand-Nash equilibrium consists of a price vector p
such that no rm has a protable deviation.
Denition. A Bertrand-Nash equilibrium price vector, p, is said to be a
free entry Bertrand equilibrium (FEBE) if some of the rms are not active,
i.e. have zero demand.
3 Bertrand Nash Equilibria
In this section we solve for the set of FEBE prices. We begin by introducing
some notations.
In case b  ^ p, let r be the minimum r such that there exists p satisfying
AC(rf(p)=2) = p. Otherwise, r = 0.
d(r) is the minimum p such that AC(rf(p)) = p.2 We assume that at
p = d(r), the average cost curve intersects the demand curve from below in
2d(r) is well dened given that (a) there exists p such that p > AC(rf(p)), and
(b) that ^ p > c = AC(q).
5the p   q plane.3
d(r;2) is the minimum p such that AC(rf(p)=2) = p.4
Note that for r large, AC(q) is negatively sloped at both rf(d(r)) and
rf(d(r;2))=2. Hence if d(r;2)  d(r) (so that d(r;2) is well dened for r  r),






r; if d(r;2) < d(r);
satises d(r) = d(r;2); otherwise:
(4)
The following lemmas will be useful later on.
Lemma 1 If ~ r satises d(r) = d(r;2), then d(r)  d(r;2) if and only if
r  ~ r.
Proof. For r greater than, but close to ~ r, AC(q) is positively sloped
at rf(d(r)) and negatively sloped at rf(d(r;2))=2. Hence d(r) > d(r;2).
Similarly for r smaller than, but close to ~ r, d(r) < d(r;2). Whereas for r
suciently large (respectively small) AC(q) is positively (respectively nega-
tively) sloped at both rf(d(r)) and rf(d(r;2))=2.
Lemma 2 There exists some minimal price p0 ( d(r)) and some maximal
m0 (> 1) corresponding to p0, such that AC(
rf(p0)
m0 )  p0.
Proof. For b < ^ p, ~ r solves d(r) = d(r;2) (since in this case r = 0). Thus
for any r  ~ r, there exists m0  2 and p0 < b such that AC(rf(p0)=m0) = p0
3The set of r for which this assumption is violated has measure zero, and hence
is without loss of generality (in the measure theoretic sense).
4d(r;2) is well dened for r  r.
6and AC(q) is negatively sloped at rf(p0)=m0. This follows since for m large
enough, rf(c)=m < q. Hence AC(rf(p0)=m0) = p0 > AC(rf(p0)=(m0 + 1)
(the inequality holds as AC(q) is negatively sloped at rf(p0)=m0).
So let b > ^ p. To begin with note that for any p < ^ p < b, AC(rf(p)=m) > p
for m large. It remains to show that there exists p  d(r) and m  2 such that
AC(rf(p)=m)  p. Let ^ r solve d(r;2) = c. For ~ r  r  ^ r, AC(rf(p)=2) = p,
for p = d(r;2)  d(r). Next consider r > ^ r, and p = d(r). In case d(r) 
AC(rf(d(r))=2), (d(r);2)  0. So let d(r) < AC(rf(d(r))=2). Next let p0
be the maximum p < d(r) such that AC(rf(p0)=2) = p0 (such a p0 exists since
r  ~ r). Then, for  (> 0) small, d(r) > p0    > AC(rf(p0   )=2).
We next dene the set of FEBE prices
Q(r) = fpj there exists a FEBE where all active rms charge pg:
We begin by showing that whether an FEBE exists or not depends on the
size of the market. In particular, an FEBE exists if and only if the market
size exceeds ~ r.
Proposition 1 (i) An FEBE exists if and only if r  ~ r.
(ii) For any p 2 Q(r), p  minf^ p;d(r);bg.
Proof. (i) Step 1. r < ~ r: Suppose to the contrary there exists some
p 2 Q(r). In case the equilibrium p involves m > 1 active rms (so that
~ r solves d(r) = d(r;2)), it follows that p > d(r). Otherwise, since r < ~ r,
from Lemma 1, d(r;2) > d(r)  p, so that AC(rf(p)=2) > p. Further, since
AC(q) is negatively sloped at rf(d(r;2))=2, AC(rf(p)=m)  AC(rf(p)=2) >
p 8m  2, so that the active rms make losses. But then, with p > d(r), an
7inactive rm can charge p0, where d(r) < p0 < p, and make a positive prot.
Hence next suppose that p involves a single active rm (for ~ r = r, this is
the only possibility). Then p = d(r) (otherwise for p > d(r) there will be
undercutting by some inactive rm, whereas for p < d(r) the single active
rm makes losses). But then this rm has zero prots, whereas it can charge
a slightly higher price and get a strictly positive prot.
Step 2. r  ~ r: Given Lemma 2, in the outcome where m0 rms each set
the price p0, and the other rms set higher prices, the active rms all earn
a non-negative prot and matching p0 by an inactive rm is not protable.
Since AC(
rf(p0)
2 )  p0, p0  d(r), so that undercutting is not protable either.
Consequently, p0 can be sustained as an equilibrium.
(ii) Let p 2 Q(r). In case p > d(r), then in the equilibrium sustaining
p, an inactive rm can charge p0, where d(r) < p0 < p, and make a prot.
Whereas if p > b, then whenever (p;m)  0, (p;m + 1) > 0 (from the
observation following Assumption 3), so that matching this p is protable
for an inactive rm.
It is well known that if rms are free to supply less than demand, then
with convex costs an equilibrium in pure strategies may not exist - the Edge-
worth paradox. This problem is resolved under Bertrand competition without
free entry (see, among others, Vives (1999))5. Proposition 1(i) shows that
depending on market size, the existence result under Bertrand competition
without free entry may, or may not extend when entry is free.
5As Baye and Kovenock (2006) and Hoernig (2007) demonstrate however, in
the presence of xed costs a Nash equilibrium may not exist.
8Remark 1 The non-existence result for r < r however depends on the as-
sumption that prices can vary continuously. Suppose to the contrary that
prices can only vary along a grid of size  (> 0), and let d(r;) be the small-
est price p in the grid such that p  d(r). A straightforward modication
of the argument in Ray Chaudhuri (1996) shows that for r < r (and  suf-
ciently small), there is a unique equilibrium where there is a single active
rm charging the price d(r;).6
Remark 2 It can be shown that Q(r) is empty in case AC(q) is either strictly
increasing, or strictly decreasing in q. First consider the case where AC(q)
is strictly decreasing in q. Clearly, the only possible FEBE price is d(r). But
then there must be at most one active rm charging this price (otherwise
the active rms make losses). Hence this rm can increase its price slightly
and make a positive prot. Next let AC(q) be strictly increasing. But in any
candidate equilibrium involving m active rms, if m rms make non-negative
prots in this equilibrium, then matching this price leads to a positive prot
for any inactive rm. In case AC(q) = c, it is easy to see that Q(r) = fcg.
Next turning to the properties of the set of FEBE prices, we show that
Q(r) is an interval, bounded and closed from below. While the set of pure
strategy Nash equilibrium prices constitutes an interval under Bertrand com-
petition without free entry as well (see, e.g. Vives (1999)), it is interesting
that this property goes through with free entry even though in this case dif-
ferent equilibrium prices can correspond to dierent number of active rms.
6The proof is available on request.
9Proposition 2 Let r  ~ r. The set of FEBE prices, Q(r), is bounded, closed
from below and is an interval.
Proof. Interval. Suppose to the contrary there exists p;p0;p00 such that
p < p0 < p00, p;p00 2 Q(r), but p0 = 2 Q(r). Further, let the FEBE price p
involve at most m active rms. Since p 2 Q(r), (p;m)  0. Hence from the
observation following Assumption 3, (p0;m)  0 (since p < p0 < p00  ^ p).
Further, since p0 < p00  b, for ~ m suciently large, (p0; ~ m) < 0. Thus
there exists some m0 such that (p0;m0)  0 > (p0;m0 + 1). Moreover since
p00 2 Q(r), p0 < p00  d(r). Consequently, the outcome where m0 rms charge
p0 and all other rms charge higher prices, can be sustained as an equilibrium.
Closed from below. Let p(r) denote the inmum of Q(r). If Q(r) is a
singleton set, then p(r) 2 Q(r). So suppose that Q(r) is not a singleton,
but p(r) = 2 Q(r). Since p(r) is a boundary point of Q(r), and p  d(r)
for any p 2 Q(r), p(r) < d(r) (strict inequality holds since Q(r) is not
a singleton). Since p(r) < b, there exists m0 such that AC(rf(p(r))=m0) 
p(r) < AC(rf(p(r))=m0+1). Otherwise there exists p00 2 Q(r) and arbitrarily
close to p(r) such that AC(rf(p00)=m) > p00 8m  2, which is a contradiction.
We can then sustain an equilibrium where m0 of the rms charge p(r) and
all other rms charge higher prices. Thus p(r) 2 Q(r).7
Remark 3 It is easy to show that Q(r) is compact in case b > ^ p. Given that
b > ^ p, any boundary point of Q(r) must be strictly less than b. We can thus
mimic the preceding argument to show that such a boundary point must be in
Q(r).
7Given Proposition 1(ii), boundedness is trivial.
10Given that Q(r) is closed from below, we can further dene
p(r) = minfp : p 2 Q(r)g:
4 Coalition-proof Nash Equilibrium
In this section we allow for the possibility of limited collusion among the
agents. We thus look for equilibria that are immune to `credible' group devi-
ations. Formally, we solve for coalition-proof free entry Bertrand equilibria
(henceforth CPFEBE).
As usual the notion of a CPFEBE is dened recursively.
We rst dene a `self-enforcing' protable deviation by a coalition. This
will be done inductively, using the size of the coalition as the basis for our
induction.
We say that a coalition T, with jTj = 1; has a self-enforcing protable
deviation from p if T has a protable deviation from p.
Suppose now we have dened self-enforcing protable deviations 8S  N;
with jSj  m  n 1; and for all price vectors p. Now consider T  N such
that jTj = m + 1. We say that T has a self-enforcing protable deviation
from p if,
i) p0
T constitutes a protable deviation for coalition T from p, and
ii) For any S  T;S 6= T, the coalition S has no self-enforcing protable
deviation from (p0
T;pN=T).
We have thus dened self-enforcing protable deviations from any given
price vector p.
11Let the FEBE sustaining p(r) involve at most m(p(r)) active rms. We
next turn to the task of dening a CPFEBE.
Denition. A vector of prices p is said to be a Coalition-proof Free
Entry Bertrand Equilibrium (CPFEBE) if no coalition T;T  N, has a self-
enforcing protable deviation from p, and there are at least m(p(r)) inactive
rms in equilibrium.
Note that the proviso that `there are at least m(p(r)) inactive rms in
equilibrium' captures the fact that we are focusing on free entry equilibria. In
order to simplify the exposition we further make the tie-breaking assumption
that a group of inactive rms all prefer to undercut and get zero prots, rather
than remain inactive.8
Interestingly, a CPFEBE exists whenever a FEBE exists. Further, it is
`unique' and involves all active rms charging p(r) (prices charged by the
inactive rms only has to satisfy the condition that they are greater than
p(r), hence the qualication on uniqueness).
Proposition 3 (i) There is a `unique' CPFEBE that involves m(p(r)) active
rms charging p(r).
8Otherwise, given that conceptually free entry allows for an innite number
of inactive rms, dening self-enforcing deviations from some vector p0 becomes
notationally cumbersome. In that case one would need to allow for an innite
sequence of deviating price vectors < p1;p2; >, pi > pi+1, where pi+1 is a
deviation from pi by a group of inactive rms and all deviating rms make positive
prots.
12(ii) At this CPFEBE all active rms make zero prots.
Proof. (i) Step 1. To show that p(r) can be sustained as a CPFEBE.
(1a). To show that there is no `self-enforcing protable' deviation by un-
dercutting from p(r), it is sucient to show that no group of m inactive rms
have a `protable' undercutting deviation from p(r). Suppose to the contrary
such a protable undercutting price p0 exists. Let m0 be the maximum m
such that AC(rf(p0)=m0) < p0 (such an m0 exists since p0 < p(r)  b). Thus
AC(
rf(p0)
m0+1)  p0. Further, p0 < p(r)  d(r). But then p0 can be sustained
as a FEBE (with m0 rms charging p0 and all other rms charging a higher
price), which is a contradiction (since p0 < p(r)).
(1b). Next suppose that all the rms charging p(r), possibly along with
some of the other rms, can deviate to some higher price ~ p and make a
gain (any deviation to a price less than p(r) is not self-enforcing). But then
m(p(r)) inactive rms can undercut by charging p(r). Further, by mimicing
the argument in (1a), it can be shown that this deviation is self-enforcing.
(1c) Finally, since AC(q) must be negatively sloped at
rf(p(r))
m(p(r))+1, matching
p(r) by any group of inactive rms is not protable.
Step 2. Turning to `uniqueness', suppose to the contrary there is some
other CPFEBE, where the active rms charge p0 6= p(r). So let p0 < p(r).
But then from 1(a), p0 must be a FEBE, a contradiction. If p0 > p(r), then
we can use the argument in step 1(b) to arrive at a contradiction.
(ii) Suppose to the contrary (p(r);m(p(r))) > 0. Since m(p(r)) is the
maximal number of active rms sustaining this price as a FEBE, (p(r);m(p(r))+
1) < 0. Thus from continuity there exists p0 < p(r) such that (p0;m(p(r))) >
130 > (p0;m(p(r)) + 1): Further, p0 < d(r). Thus p0 can be sustained as a
FEBE, which contradicts the denition of p(r):
The existence result is interesting given that under coalition-proofness,
existence is generally known to be an issue (Bernheim et al. (1987))9. While
Roy Chowdhury and Sengupta (2004) do prove existence for coalition-proof
Bertrand equilibrium, their framework is without free entry. Further, some-
what surprisingly, it turns out that limited collusion in fact leads to the
smallest FEBE price. In addition, this characterization provides an algo-
rithm for identifying the CPFEBE price that only involves solving for the
FEBE set, without explicitly checking for coalition proofness.
The fact that all active rms make zero prots is also of interest since
zero prots is not ensured either when there is free entry but no collusion
(see Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2003)), or when there is limited collusion,
but no free entry (see Roy Chowdhury and Sengupta (2004)).
Further, the contestability theory developed by Baumol et al. (1977,
1982) (among others) argues that with increasing returns and free entry,
the outcome involves a single rm with average cost pricing, i.e. zero prof-
its. Ray Chaudhuri (1996) interprets the contestable outcome as a Bertrand
equilibrium when there is increasing returns and pricing is discrete. The
present paper extends this literature by showing that even in the absence
of increasing returns, free entry, coupled with limited collusion and quasi-
convex average costs, can lead to average cost pricing (though, in contrast
9Bernheim and Whinston (1987) however show existence for certain games,
including Cournot competition
14to the contestability literature, in equilibrium there is more than one rm).
We nally examine the impact of an increase in market size on the
CPFEBE price, p(r). We nd that for any suciently large increase in
demand, i.e. r, the minimal equilibrium price falls. The intuition is that
with an increase in demand, the maximal number of active rms that can
be sustained in any equilibrium increases. This leads to greater competition,
pushing down prices.
Proposition 4 Given any r0, and any p0 such that c < p0 < p(r0), there
exists r > r0 such that 8r  r, p(r)  p0.
Proof. For any p, let q(p) denote the minimal q such that AC(q) = p. Fix
p0. Let N(r) be the largest integer such that N(r) <
rf(p0)
q(p0) . For r suciently
large, AC(
rf(p0)
N(r) ) < p0  AC(
rf(p0)
N(r)+1). Then in the outcome where N(r) rms
each set the price p, and the other rms set a higher price, the active rms
all earn a non-negative prot and matching p0 by an inactive rm is not
protable. In case any rm undercuts the price, then that rm must supply
at least rf(p0). But for r large, AC(rf(p0)) > p0. Thus p0 2 Q(r0)
Remark 4 In case AC(q) is negatively sloped at rf(p(r))=m(p(r)), it can be
shown that p(r) decreases for any small increase in r. Note that in that case
AC(rf(p(r))=m(p(r))) = p(r) < AC(rf(p(r))=m(p(r)) + 1). For a small
increase in r to r0, AC(r0f(p(r))=m(p(r))) < p(r) since AC(q) is negatively
sloped at rf(p(r))=m(p(r)). Thus from continuity, AC(r0f(p(r))=m(p(r))) <
p(r) < AC(r0f(p(r))=m(p(r)) + 1), so that p(r) 2 Q(r0). Thus from Propo-
sition 3(ii), p(r0) < p(r).
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